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NOTES
INTERCEPTING REFUGEES AT SEA: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
UNITED STATES' LEGAL AND MORAL
OBLIGATIONS
SUZANNE GLUCK
[WIe live in an age when asylum-seekers are no longer only border
crossers, but arrive by sea and by air in increasingly large numbers
in countries far away from their homelands, in Europe, in North
America and elsewhere Their very presence and the problems re-
sulting from the dimensions of this new phenomenon are exploited
by xenophobic tendencies in public opinion. I well understand the
dilemma facing many host countries, but I fear that these difficul-
ties might tempt some Governments to consider adopting restrictive
practices and deterrent measures which in my view should never be
resorted to in dealing with refugees.
Poul Hartling, Former United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees'
INTRODUCTION
The desperate plight of refugees2 seeking sanctuary in the United
States raises critical legal and humanitarian issues. While the United
States is under no legal obligation to grant asylum, even to refugees flee-
ing persecution, humanitarian concerns demand protection for victims of
persecution. Accordingly, the international community has granted ref-
ugees the right of non-refoulement, the most fundamental principle of
refugee protection.3
Formally set forth in article 33 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the
1. David A. Martin, The New Asylum Seekers, in The New Asylum Seekers: Refu-
gee Law in the 1980s 1 (David A. Martin ed., 1988) (quoting Report of Executive Com-
mittee of the High Commissioner's Programme, 35th Sess., Annex at 2, U.N. Doc. A/
AC.96/651 (1984)).
2. Congress has defined the term refugee as follows:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the
case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such
person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and
is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that coun-
try because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion ....
Refugee Act of 1980 § 201(a), Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1988)), amending Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub.
L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (current version at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 (1988 & Supp. MI
1991)).
3. Non-refoulement is derived from the French verb refouler meaning "to drive back
or to repel." The term non-refoulement describes the principle prohibiting the forced
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Status of Refugees (the "1951 Convention") and incorporated by refer-
ence in the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees
(the "U.N. Protocol"), non-refoulement prohibits the return of refugees
to countries where their lives might be threatened.4 The United States
affirmed its commitment to observe non-refoulement by embodying the
principle in section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
("INA").' The United States' obligation extends to those aliens who sat-
isfy the criteria for refugee status.6 That is, the United States is required
to protect those aliens who possess individual, well-founded fears of per-
secution on account of their race, religion, nationality, social group, or
political opinion.7 Yet the United States' current policy of interdicting
and repatriating Haitian nationals on board vessels on the high seas,
without screening for refugees, violates this basic tenet.
Political turmoil in Haiti has forced thousands of Haitians to flee,
many out of fear of persecution.' Seeking to avoid a mass migration sim-
ilar to the Cuban exodus in the 1980s, the United States has intercepted
repatriation of refugees to countries where they face persecution. See Guy S. Goodwin-
Gill, The Refugee in International Law 69 (1983).
4. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. 33, 189
U.N.T.S. 150, 176 [hereinafter 1951 Convention]. Article 33, entitled "Prohibition of
Expulsion or Return ('Refoulement')," provides:
1. No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom
would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of
a particular social group or political opinion.
2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a
refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the
security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final
judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community
of that country.
Id. The United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19
U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter U.N. Protocol] (entered into force with re-
spect to the United States, Nov. 1, 1968) incorporates, by reference, articles 2 to 34 of the
1951 Convention, supra. In 1968, the United States acceded to the U.N. Protocol,
thereby accepting article 33 as part of its domestic law.
5. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 243(h)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1988 &
Supp. III 1991). As a signatory to the U.N. Protocol, the United States was already
bound to observe non-refoulement. See supra note 4. The United States' adherence to the
principle, however, had been inadequate. In 1970, for example, Kudirka, a Lithuanian
sailor, boarded a United States Coast Guard cutter and requested asylum. Although
there was considerable evidence that Kudirka had experienced past, and feared future,
persecution, the Coast Guard returned him to his Soviet ship where he was allegedly
beaten unconscious. Congress recognized that this action was inconsistent with the U.N.
Protocol's "'generous underlying humanitarian philosophy.'" See J. Michael Cavosie,
Note, Defending the Golden Door: The Persistence of Ad Hoc and Ideological Decision
Making in U.S. Refugee Law, 67 Ind. L.J. 411, 423-24 (1992) (citation omitted). Thus, to
ensure compliance with its international obligations, Congress amended section 243(h) to
parallel the mandatory provisions of article 33. See id. at 424-25.
6. See supra note 2; infra note 64 and accompanying text.
7. See Refugee Act of 1980 § 201(a) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(42)
(1988)).
8. For a discussion of Haiti's political history, see Elizabeth Abbott, Haiti: The
Duvaliers and Their Legacy (rev. 1991).
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Haitian boats at sea and forcibly returned the passengers to Haiti without
first determining whether they are sending bona fide refugees back to
repression and persecution.9 Amnesty International characterizes the
United States' interdiction program as "an egregious violation of interna-
tional law that not only places Haitians at risk of human rights violations
upon return, but also directly undermines the international regime for
the protection of refugees." 10 Ironically, the United States continued this
practice of interdiction and forced return even after criticizing Britain, in
1989, for forcibly repatriating from Hong Kong thousands of Vietnamese
refugees. I
In an unexpected turn of events, President Clinton announced his in-
tention to continue, at least temporarily, the forced repatriations despite
his campaign statements sharply criticizing the Bush Administration's
interdiction program.1 2 During his campaign, Clinton had described the
policy as" 'another sad example of the Administration's callous response
to a terrible human tragedy.' "13 Defending his new position, Clinton
asserted that his decision was motivated by concerns for those Haitians
drowning at sea in their attempt to flee Haiti. 4 As a practical matter, a
mass exodus from Haiti was expected after Clinton's inauguration and
this policy decision was seen as the only way to prevent the onslaught.
Nevertheless, the United States' obligation to observe non-refoulement
prohibits the return of those Haitians who face persecution in Haiti. 5
Accordingly, at a minimum, non-refoulement mandates that the United
States screen the Haitians aboard the intercepted boats to ensure that
they will not be returning bona fide refugees to persecution in Haiti. 6
9. See Exec. Order No. 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,133 (1992) (President Bush's execu-
tive order authorizing this policy). On January 14, 1993, then President-elect Clinton
announced that he would temporarily continue the Bush Administration's policy of
forced repatriations despite his previous statements that labeled the program as "appal-
ling" and "an error." See Ruth Marcus & Al Kamen, Aides Say Clinton Will Extend
Policy on Returning Haitians; Move Called Temporary Better Processing of Asylum
Claims Pledged, Wash. Post, Jan. 14, 1993, at A25.
10. Brief of Amici Curiae Amnesty International and Amnesty International-USA at
3, Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir.) (No. 92-6144), cert
granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992) [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae Amnesty International].
The interdiction program may also implicate constitutional issues. See Louis Henkin,
The Constitution at Sea, 36 Me. L. Rev. 201, 215-18 (1984).
11. See David B. Ottaway, Britain Faulted on iet Repatriation; Expulsion From
Hong Kong "Unacceptable 'Administration Says, Wash. Post, Nov. 28, 1989, at A17.
12. See Al Kamen & Ruth Marcus, Clinton to Continue Forcible Repatriations of
Fleeing Haitians, Wash. Post, Jan. 15, 1993, at A16 [hereinafter Clinton to Continue For-
cible Repatriations].
13. Ruth Marcus, Clinton Besieged About Policy Shifts," Promises Not Broken, He
Insists, Wash. Post, Jan. 15, 1993, at Al.
14. See Howard W. French, Haitians' Advocates Admit Some Feelings of Betrayal,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1993, at A2.
15. See supra note 4; infra note 64.
16. The Attorney General's office has recognized that refugee status should be deter-
mined on an individual basis. See Status of Persons Who Emigrate for Economic Rea-
sons Under the Refugee Act of 1980: Memorandum Opinion for the General Counsel,
INS, 5 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 264, 267, 269 (1981). Therefore, the United States cannot
1993]
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When challenged in court by groups representing the refugees, the
United States government defended its policy by stating that the laws
that prohibit refoulement do not extend to the high seas.' 7 This defense
has in turn generated the current controversy over whether section
243(h) of the INA-the section that prohibits refoulement-applies to
aliens interdicted in international waters."8 On March 2, 1993, the
Supreme Court heard oral arguments in order to resolve a split in the
circuits on this issue.19
This Note contends that the humanitarian backdrop of section 243(h),
particularly its conformance to article 33 of the 1951 Convention, pre-
supposes an extraterritorial application. The forced repatriation of Hai-
tian refugees therefore violates both domestic and international law. Part
I reviews the United States' interdiction program, its effect on Haitian
emigres, and the subsequent litigation challenging its legality. Part II
examines the statutory language and the legislative history of both sec-
tion 243(h) and article 33 to determine the extent of the United States'
non-refoulement obligation as imposed by both the Refugee Act and in-
ternational law. Part III analyzes the United States' legal and moral ob-
ligations towards the interdicted Haitians. Finally, this Note concludes
that either the Supreme Court or Congress should provide an authorita-
tive definition of section 243(h) that explicitly states its extraterritorial
application to ensure future compliance with this fundamental principle.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Interdiction Program
In 1981, President Reagan determined that the continuous flow of ille-
gal aliens into this country was detrimental to United States interests.20
categorically define all Haitian boat people as economic migrants. Instead the United
States must provide the intercepted Haitians with individual hearings to determine refu-
gee status to ensure that bona fide refugees are not returned to their persecutors.
17. See infra notes 43-60, 72-166 and accompanying text.
18. See Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1357 (2d Cir.) ("[W]e
disagree with the eleventh circuit's conclusion that [§ ] 243(h) of the INA does not apply
to the return of refugees interdicted beyond the territorial waters of the United States."),
cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992).
19. On October 5, 1992, the Court granted certiorari. See McNary v. Haitian Ctrs.
Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992). Compare Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969
F.2d 1350 (2d Cir.) (section 243(h) applies to aliens interdicted in international waters),
cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992) with Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498(11th Cir.) (section 243(h) does not protect aliens interdicted in international waters),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992)
The government asserts that the Supreme Court can reverse the Second Circuit's deci-
sion without reaching the merits under alternate theories: 1) the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act precludes judicial review, 2) the Haitian class is barred by collateral
estoppel, and 3) equitable principles prevent injunctive relief against a President's order
in the area of foreign affairs. See Brief for Petitioners at 10-13, McNary v. Haitian Ctrs.
Council, Inc. (U.S. 1992) (No. 92-344) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioners].
20. See Proclamation No. 4865, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,107 (1981). Reagan was particularly
concerned with the mass Haitian migration. See Arthur C. Helton, The Mandate of U.S.
[Vol. 61
1993] INTERCEPTING REFUGEES A T SEA
Therefore, he issued an executive order authorizing the Secretary of State
to enter into "cooperative arrangements" with foreign governments to
prevent illegal migration into the United States by sea.2 Significantly,
the order mandated "strict observance of [the United States'] interna-
tional obligations concerning those who genuinely flee persecution in
their homeland"' 22-that is, strict adherence to the principle of non-
refoulement.23
The United States subsequently entered into one such cooperative
agreement with Haiti. Under the agreement, the United States Coast
Guard was authorized to stop and board Haitian boats suspected of car-
rying illegal immigrants and to return them to Haiti.24 The agreement
provided, however, that the United States would not return any Haitian
Courts to Protect Aliens and Refugees Under International Human Rights Law, 100 Yale
L.J. 2335, 2341 (1991).
Interestingly, the previous year President Reagan had stated:
Can we doubt that only a Divine Providence placed this land, this island of
freedom, here as a refuge for all those people in the world who yearn to breathe
free? Jews, and Christians enduring persecution behind the Iron Curtain; the
boat people of Southeast Asia, Cuba and of Haiti ....
Text of Reagan's Speech Accepting the Republicans' Nomination, N.Y. Times, July 18,
1980, at A8.
21. See Exec. Order No. 12,324, § 1, 3 C.F.R. 180 (1982), reprinted in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182 (1988). Executive Order 12,324 instructed the Coast Guard to "enforce the sus-
pension of the entry of undocumented aliens and the interdiction of any defined vessel
carrying such aliens," id § 2(a), as follows:
(1) To stop and board defined vessels, when there is reason to believe that
such vessels are engaged in the irregular transportation of persons or violations
of United States law or the law of a country with which the United States has
an arrangement authorizing such action.
(2) To make inquiries of those on board, examine documents and take such
actions as are necessary to establish the registry, condition and destination of
the vessel and the status of those on board the vessel.
(3) To return the vessel and its passengers to the country from which it came,
when there is reason to believe that an offense is being committed against the
United States immigration laws, or appropriate laws of a foreign country with
which we have an arrangement to assist; provided, however, that no person who
is a refugee will be returned without his consent.
Id § 2(c)(1)-(3).
22. Id § 3.
23. See Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1500-01 (11th Cir.), cerL
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992).
24. See Interdiction Agreement Between the United States of America and Haiti,
Sept. 23, 1981, U.S.-Haiti, 33 U.S.T. 3559 [hereinafter U.S.-Haiti Agreement]. The
agreement provided, in part, as follows:
Upon boarding a Haitian flag vessel, in accordance with this agreement, the
authorities of the United States Government may address inquiries, examine
documents and take such measures as are necessary to establish the registry,
condition and destination of the vessel and the status of those on board the
vessel. When these measures suggest that an offense against United States im-
migration laws or appropriate Haitian laws has been or is being committed, the
Government of the Republic of Haiti consents to the detention on the high seas
by the United States Coast Guard of the vessels and persons found on board.
The Government of Haiti agrees to permit upon prior notification the return
of detained vessels and persons to a Haitian port, or if circumstances permit, the
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whom authorities deemed qualified for refugee status. By including this
provision, the United States acknowledged the potential culpability of
"actually returning refugees to a country where they may be endangered,
even though such actions take place in an area wholly outside its territo-
rial jurisdiction."2 The government delegated to Immigration and Nat-
uralization Service ("INS") officials responsibility for determining
whether any of the interdicted Haitians "had sufficiently credible claims
of persecution to be 'screened-in' to the United States to pursue asylum
applications."26
The INS established guidelines for field officers to follow in making
this determination.27 Under these guidelines, INS officials interviewed
passengers on interdicted boats to discover whether they had a legitimate
claim for asylum.2" Officials who lacked training in asylum law, how-
ever, often made these determinations based on hasty interviews on
board crowded vessels.29 Haitians who demonstrated a "credible fear" of
persecution were "screened-in" and brought to the United States to con-
tinue the asylum process.3 0 The remaining Haitians were "screened-out"
United States Government will release such vessels and migrants on the high
seas to representatives of the Government of the Republic of Haiti.
The United States Government appreciates the assurances which it has re-
ceived from the Government of the Republic of Haiti that Haitians returned to
their country and who are not traffickers will not be subject to prosecution for
illegal departure.
It is understood that under these arrangements the United States Govern-
ment does not intend to return to Haiti any Haitian migrants whom the United
States authorities determine to qualify for refugee status.
Id. at 3559-60. This agreement was necessary because international law prohibits a na-
tion from intercepting another country's vessel on the high seas without an agreement
between the two parties. See Louis B. Sohn, Interdiction of Vessels on the High Seas, 18
Int'l Law. 411, 418 (1984).
25. Goodwin-Gill, supra note 3, at 95.
26. Susan Beck, Cast Away: How the INS Tried to Save the Haitians, and How Bush
Administration Hard-line Policies Prevailed, Am. Law., Oct. 1992 at 54, 54; see also Abi-
gail D. King, Note, Interdiction: The United States' Continuing Violation of International
Law, 68 B.U. L. Rev. 773, 777-78 (1988) (describing the INS's role in screening for
refugees).
27. See Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1501-02 (1 1th Cir.), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992).
28. See id. These interviews were required only "[t]o the extent that it ... [was],
within the opinion of the Commanding Officer of the United States Coast Guard vessel,
safe and practicable." Id. at 1502.
29. See Beck, supra note 26, at 56.
30. See id. In order to qualify for asylum under § 208(a) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, an alien must demonstrate refugee status as defined in § 101(a)(42),
which requires a "well-founded fear of persecution." See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480
U.S. 421, 428 (1987); infra note 63 and accompanying text. This is a higher standard
than the preliminary "credible fear" test the INS officials employed. To qualify for pro-
tection against refoulement under § 243(h), an alien must meet an even higher standard
and establish a "clear probability of persecution." INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 413
(1984); see infra note 64 and accompanying text.
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and were immediately repatriated to Haiti.3
On September 20, 1991, a military coup ousted Jean Bertrand Aristide,
Haiti's first democratically elected president in 200 years.32 Americas
Watch, the National Coalition for Haitian Refugees, and Physicians for
Human Rights, described the grim climate of political turmoil and perse-
cution that followed:
In the period immediately following the coup, massacre and wide-
spread killings were the order of the day. Since then, techniques have
become more refined but similarly brutal. Selected assassinations, dis-
appearances, severe beatings and political unrests continue. Entire
neighborhoods, particularly in the poor and populous shantytowns of
Port-au-Prince and across the countryside that voted for Aristide al-
most unanimously, have been targeted for particularly brutal and con-
centrated attacks. Common people are arrested merely for having
photographs of President Aristide in their home or for the possession
of pro-Aristide literature.33
As conditions in Haiti worsened, migration to the United States in-
creased.34 In response, the United States government temporarily sus-
pended the interdiction and repatriation program, but resumed the
practice on November 18, 1991.3 The INS continued to screen for refu-
gees, now at the United States Naval Base at Guantfinamo Bay, Cuba.36
Under new leadership, INS officials implemented improved screening
procedures and began reaching an average "screen-in" rate of thirty per-
cent.37 Believing that this rate was too high, President Bush issued Exec-
utive Order 12,807,38 authorizing the United States Coast Guard to
intercept boatloads of Haitian refugees at sea and to return them immedi-
ately to Haiti without consideration of their claims for political asylum.39
31. See Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1502 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 112 S.Ct. 1245 (1992).
32. See id
33. 138 Cong. Rec. S13,095, S13,095 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1992) (quoting report issued
December 31, 1991, by Americas Watch, the National Coalition for Haitian Refugees,
and Physicians for Human Rights).
34. See Baker, 953 F.2d at 1502.
35. See iL
36. See infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
37. See Beck, supra note 26, at 55. Between 1981 and 1990 the average screen-in rate
had been less then one percent. See id
38. 57 Fed. Reg. 23,133 (1992).
39. See id. The executive order provided, in part, as follows:
(2) The international legal obligations of the United States under the United
Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees to apply Article 33 of the
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees do not extend to
persons located outside the territory of the United States
Sec. 2. (a)... [T]he Secretary of State, shall issue appropriate instructions to
the Coast Guard in order to enforce the suspension of the entry of undocu-
mented aliens by sea and the interdiction of any defined vessel carrying such
aliens.
Id (citation omitted). The executive order further stated that the Attorney General, "in
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The Bush program differed from the Reagan program in one critical as-
pect: it terminated the screening requirement altogether, so that even
bona fide refugees with legitimate claims of persecution were returned to
Haiti.
When the new program was implemented, immigration officials found
that one-third of those interdicted had a credible claim for asylum. 40
Thus, the Bush Administration's immediate repatriation policy "jeopard-
ize[d] Haitian refugees, and mean[t] that the example of the United
States will be cited whenever other nations decide to slam their own
doors on refugees and force them back into the hands of their oppres-
sors."'" President Clinton's decision to pursue temporarily the Bush pol-
icy of forced repatriations, therefore, continues to endanger the lives of
those Haitians who qualify for refugee status.42
B. Challenges to the Interdiction Program
President Reagan's interdiction program, was first challenged in Hai-
tian Refugee Center v. Gracey.43 In that case, the plaintiffs claimed that
the program violated the United States' non-refoulement obligation
under section 243(h) and article 33 by creating a substantial risk that the
government would forcibly return refugees to countries where they faced
persecution." After a cursory analysis, the district court dismissed this
his unreviewable discretion, may decide that a person who is a refugee will not be re-
turned without his consent." Id. § 2(c)(3). President Bush, however, emphasized that
this order should not be "construed to require any procedures to determine whether a
person is a refugee." Id § 3.
Though the executive order did not specifically mention Haiti, a statement issued the
same day from the White House Press Secretart noted that the president had " 'issued an
executive order which will permit the U.S. Coast Guard to begin returning Haitians
picked up at sea directly to Haiti.'" Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d
1350, 1353 (2d Cir.) (quoting Office of the Press Secretary (May 24, 1992)), cert. granted,
113 S. Ct. 52 (1992).
President Bush defended his policy: "Yes, the Statue of Liberty still stands and we still
open our arms to people that are politically oppressed. We cannot, as long as the laws are
on the books, open the doors to economic refugees all over the world." 138 Cong. Rec.
H3,91 1, H3,911 (daily ed. May 28, 1992) (statement of Rep. Conyers quoting President
Bush). This statement does not address the issue because § 243(h) and article 33 were
adopted for that very reason-to distinguish between economic and political refugees.
40. See 138 Cong. Rec. S13,096, S13,096 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1992) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy). Applications for asylum now may be brought at the U.S. Embassy in Port-au-
Prince. Those who fear persecution, however, do not feel that this is a practicable alter-
native. See infra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
41. 138 Cong. Rec. S13,096, S13,096 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1992) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy).
42. See French, supra note 14.
43. 600 F. Supp. 1396 (D.D.C. 1985), aff'don other grounds, 809 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
44. See id. at 1401. The plaintiffs also alleged that the government violated the Fifth
Amendment by depriving the interdicted Haitian refugees of their liberty and rights pro-
vided by the Refugee Act and the INA. Additionally, the plaintiffs charged the govern-
ment with violating an extradition statute and the Extradition Treaty between the United
States and Haiti. See id.
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claim, holding that section 243(h) does not apply to those interdicted on
the high seas.45
Following the military coup in Haiti, the United States continued to
"screen-out" and return to Haiti those refugees who failed to demon-
strate a credible fear of persecution. The government, though, started to
bring the "screened-in" Haitians to the U.S. Naval Base at Guantinamo
Bay, Cuba.4' In November 1991, the Haitian Refugee Center, represent-
ing the class of "screened-out" Haitians, brought suit challenging the ad-
equacy of the screening process. The Southern District of Florida
immediately issued a temporary restraining order precluding the forced
repatriations.47 Because the interdiction program continued, the govern-
ment decided to house all the interdictees at Guantinamo Bay.4" The
district court subsequently issued a preliminary injunction continuing the
prohibition against the forced repatriations until the screening interviews
improved or a hearing on the merits could be held.49 Citing Gracey, the
Eleventh Circuit held that section 243(h) does not protect aliens inter-
dicted at sea and reversed the district court's injunctions."0 Although the
Supreme Court denied certiorari, Justice Blackmun, in his dissent, recog-
nized that the question of whether interdicted Haitians have a right to
protest forced repatriations "is difficult and susceptible to competing in-
terpretations.""1 Moreover, he noted that if Haitians are to be returned
45. See id. at 1404.
46. See Brief for Respondents at 3, McNary v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. (U.S. 1992)
(No. 92-344) [hereinafter Brief for Respondents].
47. See Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, No. 91-2653-CIV-ATKINS, 1991 WL
330942 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 19, 1991); Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 789 F. Supp. 1552,
1557 (S.D. Fla. 1991), injunction dissolved and remanded by 949 F.2d 1109 (11th Cir.
1991), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992).
48. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 19, at 4.
49. See Baker, 789 F. Supp. at 1578. The Haitian Refugee Center sought relief under
(1) article 33, (2) the First and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution, (3) Executive
Order 12,324 and the INS guidelines, (4) The Refugee Act of 1980, (5) the Immigration
and Nationality Act, and (6) the Administrative and Procedures Act ("APA"). See id at
1567. The district court granted the preliminary injunction because it found that the
plaintiffs had demonstrated a substantial likelihood that the interdiction program violated
article 33 and that the Haitian Refugee Center could succeed on its First Amendment
claim. See id at 1571, 1574.
Subsequently, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the preliminary injunction. The court
concluded that article 33 is not self-executing and, therefore, does not protect the Haitian
plaintiffs. See Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Baker, 949 F.2d 1109, 1110-11 (1lth Cir.
1991), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992); infra notes 154-57. In addition, the court
found that the First Amendment claim did not support an injunction. See Baker, 949
F.2d at 1110-11. The district court on remand, however, entered further injunctions
under the APA. See Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, No. 91-2653-CIV-ATKINS,
1991 WL 330944 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 18, 1991); Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, No. 91-
2635-CIV-ATKINS, 1991 WL 330943 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 23, 1991).
50. See Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1510, 1515 (11th Cir.),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 52 (1992). The court also rejected the Haitian Refugee Center's
claims under (1) the APA, (2) Executive Order 12,324 and the INS Guidelines, and (3)
the First Amendment. See id, at 1505-15.
51. Haitian Refugee Ctrs., Inc. v. Baker, 112 S. Ct. 1245, 1246 (1992).
1993]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
to possible persecution "that ruling should come from this Court, after
full and careful consideration of the merits of their claims."5 2
The next challenge to the interdiction program was brought in Haitian
Centers Council, Inc. v. McNary.5 s This time, the certified class consisted
of " '[a]ll Haitian citizens who have been or will be "screened in."' ,.1
The plaintiffs contested the United States government's new policy of
reinterviewing and repatriating "screened-in" Haitians detained in hold-
ing areas on Guantinamo Bay without attorneys present.5  The district
court issued a preliminary injunction56 and held that the "screened-in"
plaintiffs comprised a new class and as such the court was not bound by
the outcome in Baker.57 The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's
injunction with modifications.58
The latest challenge followed the May 24, 1992, executive order by
President Bush that authorized immediate repatriations to Haiti without
any screening for refugees. The Haitian Centers Council contended that
the new interdiction program violated article 33 of the 1951 Convention
and section 243(h) of the INA. 9 Focusing on the scope of section
243(h), the Second Circuit rejected the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning in
Baker, and held that the statute encompassed Haitians interdicted at
sea.' ° On October 5, 1992, the Supreme Court granted certiorari6 to
resolve the split in the circuits that this decision created.
II. THE REFUGEE AcT OF 1980
The primary issue that has divided the circuits is whether section
243(h) of the INA, as amended by the Refugee Act of 1980, protects
aliens interdicted on the high seas. The humanitarian framework of the
Refugee Act, the ordinary meaning of the language of section 243(h), and
its legislative history all point towards an extraterritorial application.
The Refugee Act of 1980 reflects the United States' commitment to
52. Id.
53. No. 92 CV 1258, 1992 WL 155853 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 6), aff'd in part, 969 F.2d
1326 (2d Cir. 1992).
54. Brief for Respondents, supra note 46, at 4-5 (quoting Memorandum of Law in
Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Provisional Class Certification at 3).
55. See McNary, 1992 WL 155853, at *5.
56. See id. at *10.
57. See id. at *4.
58. See Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1326, 1347 (2d Cir. 1992).
59. See Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, No. 92 CV 1258, 1992 WL 155853 at
* 11 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 6), order rev'd in part by 969 F.2d 1350 (2d. Cir.), cert. granted, 113
S. Ct. 52 (1992). The Haitian Centers Council also challenged the program under (1) the
U.S.-Haiti Agreement, (2) the APA, and (3) the Fifth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause. See Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1353 (2d. Cir.), cert.
granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992).
60. See id at 1361. The Second Circuit found that the plaintiffs certified in McNary
were not members of the class certified in Baker and thus were not bound by the Eleventh
Circuit's decision. See id. at 1355-56. The government, however, argues that this deci-
sion was barred by collateral estoppel. See supra note 19.
61. See McNary v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992).
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"human rights and humanitarian concerns,"62 particularly the need to
protect those aliens fleeing persecution. This commitment is articulated
in two separate provisions of the Act. First, section 208(a) authorizes the
Attorney General to grant political asylum to refugees on a discretionary
basis.63 This provision recognizes, however, that the United States can
only accept a limited number of refugees from around the world. There-
fore, in order to ensure compliance with the humanitarian objective of
the Act, Congress added a second protection by amending section 243(h)
to prohibit the return of any aliens to a country where their safety would
be threatened. Section 243(h), as amended, provides the following:
The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien ... to a
country if the Attorney General determines that such alien's life or
freedom would be threatened in such country on account of race, reli-
gion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.64
Prior to 1980, section 243(h) had authorized the Attorney General "to
withhold deportation of any alien within the United States to any country
in which in his opinion the alien would be subject to persecution on ac-
count of race, religion, or political opinion. "65 By contrast, the revised
statute makes the Attorney General's responsibilities under this provi-
sion obligatory rather than discretionary and expands the scope of the
statute to include "any alien" as opposed to "any alien within the United
States."6 6 The deletion of the term "within the United States" led to the
current controversy over whether section 243(h), as amended, applies to
aliens intercepted in international waters.67
A. Statutory Construction
The argument supporting extraterritorial application of section 243(h)
of the INA relies on the most basic principle of statutory construction-
62. S. Rep. No. 256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
141, 141.
63. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988). Sec-
tion 208 defines the Attorney General's discretionary authority as follows-
(a) The Attorney General shall establish a procedure for an alien physically
present in the United States or at a land border or port of entry, irrespective of
such alien's status, to apply for asylum, and the alien may be granted asylum in
the discretion of the Attorney General if the Attorney General determines that
such alien is a refugee ....
(b) Asylum granted under subsection (a) of this section may be terminated if
the Attorney General, pursuant to such regulations as the Attorney General
may prescribe, determines that the alien is no longer a refugee ... owing to a
change in circumstances in the alien's country of nationality ....
8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)-(o).
64. Immigration and Nationality Act § 243(h)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1988 &
Supp III 1991).
65. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1357 (2d Cir.), cert.
granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992) (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 1357-58.
67. See id. at 1358.
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that in the absence of "a clearly expressed legislative intention to the
contrary," the plain meaning of the statute controls.6" On its face, sec-
tion 243(h) prohibits the return of "any alien," without limiting its appli-
cation to aliens physically located in the United States.6" Because the
term "alien" includes "any person not a citizen or national of the United
States,"' Congress has made it clear that "aliens are aliens, regardless of
where they are located."71
Nevertheless, the Bush Administration contended that section 243(h)
must be construed in light of the presumption against extraterritorial ap-
plication.72 This presumption is used to discern "unexpressed congres-
sional intent,"17 3 but should only be employed after all traditional
methods of determining congressional intent are exhausted.7 4 Accord-
ingly, the Second Circuit found the presumption irrelevant because Con-
gress had articulated its intent "by making [section] 243(h)[ ] apply to
'any alien' without regard to location."75 Additionally, the presumption
against extraterritorial application is based on the premise that Congress
"'is primarily concerned with domestic conditions.' "76 Section 243(h),
however, expressly reflects the United States' commitment to an interna-
tional concern. Because it applies to persons fleeing other countries, sec-
68. American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982) (quoting Consumer
Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)).
69. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
70. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(3) (1988).
71. See Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1358 (2d Cir.), cert.
granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992).
72. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1230 (1991); McNary, 969
F.2d at 1358; Brief for Petitioners, supra note 19, at 27.
73. See McNary, 969 F.2d at 1358 (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281,
285 (1949)).
74. See Arabian Am. Oil, 111 S. Ct. at 1237 (Marshall, J., dissenting). To strengthen
the presumption against extraterritoriality, the government employed the same "selective
quotation[s]" that the dissent criticized the majority for using in Arabian Am. Oil. See Id.
at 1238-39; Brief for Petitioner, supra note 19, at 33. The government stated that legisla-
tion with "broad definitional or jurisdictional provisions," will only apply domestically in
the absence of" 'specific language'" to the contrary. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 19,
at 33 (quoting McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10,
19 (1963)). The full sentence in McCulloch reads as follows: "[Petitioners] have been
unable to point to any specific language in the Act itself or in its extensive legislative
history that reflects such a congressional intent." McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 19 (emphasis
added). Additionally, the government quoted New York Central R.R. v. Chisholm, 268
U.S. 29 (1925), as declaring that such legislation will only apply in the United States "in
the absence of 'words which definitely disclose an intention to give it extraterritorial ef-
fect.'" Brief for Petitioners, supra note 19, at 33 (quoting New York Central R.R., 268
U.S. at 31). The Court in New York Central R.R., however, did not apply the Federal
Employers Liability Act extraterritorially, finding that the statute "contains no words
which definitely disclose an intention to give it extraterritorial effect, nor do the circum-
stances require an inference of such purpose." New York Central R.R., 268 U.S. at 31(emphasis added) (citation omitted); see Arabian Am. Oil, 111 S. Ct. at 1238-39 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).
75. McNary, 969 F.2d at 1358.
76. Arabian Am. Oil, 111 S. Ct. at 1230 (quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281,
285 (1949)).
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tion 243(h), by its very nature, does not concentrate on purely domestic
affairs.77 Furthermore, the presumption against extraterritorial applica-
tion is normally invoked "to protect against unintended clashes between
our laws and those of other nations which could result in international
discord."' 71 With respect to the interdiction program, a broad interpreta-
tion of section 243(h) will not create international conflicts, as "Haitian
law-particularly, the U.S.-Haiti Agreement-forbids the return of refu-
gees interdicted on the high seas. '"17
Moreover, limiting the statute to those aliens found in the United
States would return the section to its pre-1980 status8 -- in effect adding
"terms or provisions where [C]ongress has omitted them."'" But courts
should not supply omitted terms, for" '[flew principles of statutory con-
struction are more compelling than the proposition that Congress does
not intend sub silentio to enact statutory language that it has earlier
discarded.' "8s2
In response, the government maintained that Congress deleted the
phrase "within the United States" merely to bring excludable aliens8 -
aliens whose characteristics deny them legal entry-within the scope of
section 243(h).11 In 1958, the Supreme Court, in Leng May Ma v. Bar-
ber,' held that excludable aliens paroled 6 in the United States are not
entitled to relief under section 243(h). Therefore, the government rea-
soned that Congress amended section 243(h) in an attempt to remedy the
holding in Barber. The legislative history supports this view by stating
that section 243(h), as amended, applies to aliens seeking asylum in ex-
77. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 46, at 36.
78. Arabian Am. Oil, 111 S. Ct. at 1230.
79. Reply Brief for Appellants at 5, Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d
1350 (2d. Cir.) (No. 92-6144) [hereinafter Reply Brief for Appellants] (footnote omitted),
cert. granted, 113 S. CL 52 (1992); see U.S.-Haiti Agreement, supra note 24, at 3560.
Additionally, applying § 243(h) to the high seas does not conflict with Haiti's laws be-
cause "no nation can claim the sovereign right to have political refugees returned to it for
persecution." Brief for Respondents, supra note 46, at 37.
80. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
81. McNary, 969 F.2d at 1359.
82. Id. (quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 392-
93 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
83. An excludable alien has reached the United States border but "has not been for-
mally permitted to enter the country." Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204, 205 n. 1 (2d Cir.
1982). Even if he is temporarily admitted on parole, the excludable alien will be
"'treated as if stopped at the border.'" Id. (quoting Shaughnessy v. United States ex reL
Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 215 (1953)). Section 212(a) of the INA lists the statutory grounds
for exclusion. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
84. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 19, at 52-53; McNary, 969 F.2d at 1373-74
(Walker, J., dissenting).
85. 357 U.S. 185 (1958).
86. The parole provision permits aliens to remain in the United States temporarily
until a decision is made as to their ultimate status. But parole is not considered an admis-
sion of the alien into the United States. See Immigration and Nationality Act
§ 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
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clusion as well as deportation proceedings.8 7 As the Haitian Centers
Council has pointed out, however, this theory does not explain why Con-
gress removed the entire geographic limitation from section 243(h) rather
than simply substituting the words "physically present within the United
States" as it did in section 208.88
The location of section 243(h) within the INA appears to provide the
strongest support for a purely domestic interpretation. The Eleventh
Circuit in Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Baker 9 and the District of
Columbia in Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Gracey90 relied primarily on
the fact that section 243(h) is included in part V of the INA, the section
addressing deportation. Both courts reasoned that because deportation
provisions in part V only affect aliens in the United States, section 243(h)
must be similarly limited.91
Section 243(h)'s location, however, merely reflects its pre-1980 place-
ment, when it applied only to deportation proceedings. The courts' anal-
ysis would limit each section in part V to deportation proceedings. But,
as stated above, section 243(h) clearly applies in exclusion proceedings as
well.9 2 Moreover, other sections in part V limit their scope to aliens in or
within the United States. This fact further supports a broad reading of
the term "any alien" in section 243(h), 93 because "where Congress in-
cludes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in an-
other section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion. 94
Similarly, the language in section 243(h)(2)(C)" specifically excluding
87. See S. Rep. No. 256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1979), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 141, 157.
88. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 46, at 18-19, 24-25; supra note 63. The
Haitian Centers Council also questions the absence of any mention of Barber in the legis-
lative history and why twenty-two years passed before Congress "'corrected'" Barber.
Id. at 25.
89. 953 F.2d 1498 (1Ith Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992).
90. 600 F. Supp. 1396 (D.D.C. 1985), aff'd on other grounds, 809 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
91. See Baker, 953 F.2d at 1510; Gracey, 600 F. Supp. at 1404.
92. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 46, at 18.
93. See Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1360 (2d Cir.), cert.
granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992).
94. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 (1987) (citations omitted).
95. Paragraph 2 of section 243(h) states that the following groups are not entitled to
the benefits of 243(h)(1):
(A) the alien ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the per-
secution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in
a particular social group, or political opinion;
(B) the alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly
serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of the United States;
(C) there are serious reasons for considering that the alien has committed a
serious nonpolitical crime outside the United States prior to the arrival of the
alien in the United States; or
(D) there are reasonable grounds for regarding the alien as a danger to the
security of the United States.
INTERCEPTING REFUGEES AT SEA
aliens who committed a serious crime prior to their arrival "in the
United States," does not limit the application of the entire section to
aliens present in the United States. The interest of Congress in barring
the entry of criminal aliens does not suggest an intent to permit the forci-
ble return of "noncriminal aliens who have not entered, and may have no
desire ever to enter, United States territory."96 Instead, Congress may
have intended this section to expand the prohibition to a broader class of
aliens while preserving the limitation in its exceptions clause.
A literal reading of section 243(h) suggests that the phrase "if the At-
torney General determines" does not require the Attorney General to
determine whether a particular alien is fleeing persecution.9" Commenta-
tors have rejected this argument with respect to article 33 of the U.N.
Protocol, the section analogous to 243(h) of the INA.98 Article 33 and
section 243(h) were both designed to protect those refugees fleeing perse-
cution. Therefore, "it would scarcely be consonant with considerations
of good faith for a state to seek to avoid the principle of non-refoulement
by declining to make a determination of status." 99
Furthermore, simply because section 243(h) restricts only the Attor-
ney General's actions, the President is not vested with the authority to
order the Coast Guard to execute the interdiction program."°° Indeed,
Congress constrained the Attorney General's actions specifically because
the Attorney General is the President's agent with respect to immigra-
tion matters."' 1 Section 243(h) would lose its meaning if "returning an
alien to his persecutors-was forbidden if done by the [A]ttomey
[G]eneral but permitted if done by some other arm of the executive
branch." 2
Finally, the dissent in Barber,"0 3 recognized that when constructing "a
human provision" such as section 243(h), "[t]he spirit of the law provides
the true guide."' 0 4 Interpreting section 243(h) in accordance with its hu-
manitarian objectives mandates a broad application encompassing refu-
gees at sea.
8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
96. Brief for Respondents, supra note 46, at 19-20; see McNary, 969 F.2d at 1359.
97. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 19, at 30.
98. See supra note 4; infra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
99. Goodwin-Gill, supra note 3, at 73.
100. See Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1360 (2d Cir.), cerL
granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992).
101. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1988). Section 1103 describes the Attorney General's
powers and duties. Specifically, the "Attorney General shall be charged with the admin-
istration and enforcement of this chapter and all other laws relating to the immigration
and naturalization of aliens ... ." I See also Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 965-66(11th Cir. 1984) (discussing the Attorney General's responsibility for immigration mat-
ters), aff'd, 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
102. McNary, 969 F.2d at 1360.
103. 357 U.S. 185, 192 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
104. Id
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B. Legislative History and Purpose
One of Congress' primary purposes in enacting the Refugee Act of
1980 was to bring United States refugee law into conformance with the
U.N. Protocol. 105 Specifically, Congress amended section 243(h) to con-
form its language to article 33 of the Protocol.' 6 Accordingly, section
243(h) "has the same scope and force as article 33."'1o7
In his May 1992 executive order, President Bush declared that the
United States' international obligations under article 33 "do not extend
to persons located outside the territory of the United States."'0 8 In de-
termining whether this pronouncement accurately defines article 33's
scope, the Court must interpret the U.N. Protocol "in good faith in ac-
cordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty
in their context and in the light of its object and purpose."' 9 Addition-
ally, "[t]reaties are to be construed in a broad and liberal spirit, and,
when two constructions are possible, one restrictive of rights that may be
claimed under it and the other favorable to them, the latter is to be
preferred.""o
The Second Circuit concluded that the plain meaning of the language
of article 33 shows that where the refugee is to be returned to, not where
105. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1987).
106. See INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 421 (1984). The legislative history confirms that
Congress adopted section 243(h) "with the understanding that it is based directly upon
the language of the Protocol and it is intended that the provision be construed consistent
with the Protocol." H.R. Rep. No. 781, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 141, 161.
107. Brief for Appellants at 15, Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350
(2d Cir.) (No. 92-6144), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992).
108. Exec. Order No. 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg. 23, 133 (1992).
109. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, concluded May 23, 1969, § 3, art. 31,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Conven-
tion]. Other considerations that must be taken into account for the purposes of interpret-
ing a treaty include the following:
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise,
in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) Any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the par-
ties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) Any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with
the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument
related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpreta-
tion of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes
the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between
the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties
so intended.
Id.
110. Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 342 (1924).
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the refugee is returned from, is the most important criterion."'I The
court's analysis rested upon the fact that the definition of a "refugee"
under the U.N. Protocol, I2 just as with "any alien" under section 243(h)
of the INA, focuses on one's past rather than present location."13 Fur-
thermore, if the parties to the 1951 Convention intended to limit article
33's application to those "refugees who have entered the territory of the
contracting state," they would have specified this limitation as they had
in other articles of the Convention. 114
Article 33, however, provides that "[n]o Contracting State shall expel
or return ('refouler')" any refugee."I5 The placement of the French word
"refouler" after "return" clouds the plain meaning of the provision. One
definition of refouler is to "expel (aliens)." 6 Under this meaning, the
term "connotes ejection of an alien from within the territory of the Con-
tracting State. ' 117 Alternatively, Dictionnaire Larousse "suggests that
['refouler'] implies repelling or driving back an alien who has not yet
entered.""' 8 In contrast, commentators have defined refoulement as a
term of art "to be distinguished from expulsion or deportation."" 9 Be-
cause of these conflicting interpretations, the term "is not susceptible to a
plain language analysis."' 2
Paragraph 2 of article 33,121 like section 243(h)(2)(C),' delineates an
exception to the prohibition of refoulement. Under this exception, a refu-
gee may not claim the benefit of article 33 if he is a danger to the security
111. See Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1362 (2d Cir.), cert.
granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992). In his dissent, Judge Walker disagreed with the meaning
attributed to the term "return." Judge Walker believed that the plain language did not
indicate "where the Article prohibits 'return' from." Id at 1377 (emphasis added).
Therefore, he concluded that the court needed to look to the negotiating history to deter-
mine the meaning of "return." Id For an analysis of the negotiating history, see infra
notes 141-53 and accompanying text.
112. The definition of a refugee under the Refugee Act of 1980 is based on the U.N.
Protocol's definition which includes any person "owing to a well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country." 1951
Convention, supra note 4, art. 1, 1 A(2) at 152 (as amended by U.N. Protocol, supra note
4, art. 1, 2, 19 U.S.T. at 6225, 606 U.N.T.S. at 268).
113. See McNary, 969 F.2d at 1362.
114. .d; see e.g., 1951 Convention, supra note 4, art. 4, at 156 ("refugees within their
territories"); id., supra note 4, art. 15, at 162 ("refugees lawfully staying in their
territory").
115. See 1951 Convention, supra note 4, at 176.
116. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 19, at 38-39 (quoting Cassell's French Dic-
tionary 627 (1978)).
117. Id
118. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1363 (2d Cir.), cert
granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992).
119. Goodwin-Gill, supra note 3, at 69.
120. McNary, 969 F.2d at 1377 (Walker, J., dissenting).
121. See 1951 Convention, supra note 4.
122. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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of "the country in which he is."12 Thus, the government claims that, as
the only geographic reference in the article, this phrase limits both
paragraphs.1 24 The Second Circuit, nevertheless, found that article
33(1)'s "silence on geographic limitation shouts loudly its proper mean-
ing."' 25 In other words, as stated above, the express territorial limita-
tions in other articles of the 1951 Convention prove that "the parties
knew how to restrict a provision's territorial reach when they
wanted."
126
The objective and purpose of article 33 further support a broad appli-
cation. The U.N. Protocol was "designed to protect refugees fleeing
bona fide political persecution." 127 As a result, it is inconsistent to claim
that the U.N. Protocol "could have been intended not to provide protec-
tion to the Haitians fleeing the brutal, military regime now in power on
the ground that those fleeing had not yet reached the territory of a Party
to the Protocol."1
28
More specifically, the desperate plight of Jewish refugees during World
War II prompted the international community to adopt the principle of
non-refoulement. As Judge Hatchett explained:
Jewish refugees seeking to escape the horror of Nazi Germany sat on
ships in New York Harbor, only to be rebuffed and returned to Nazi
Germany gas chambers. Does anyone seriously contend that the
United States's responsibility for the consequences of its inaction
would have been any less if the United States had stopped the refugee
ships before they reached our territorial waters? Having promised the
international community of nations that it would not turn back refu-
gees at the border, the government yet contends that it may go out into
international waters and actively prevent Haitian refugees from reach-
ing the border. Such a contention makes a sham of our international
treaty obligations and domestic laws for the protection of refugees. 129
President Bush's interpretation of article 33 states that it does not ap-
ply to aliens outside the United States.13 0 Although this interpretation is
entitled to "great weight,"'13 1 it must still follow the dictates of the Vi-
123. See 1951 Convention, supra note 4.
124. See Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1364 (2d Cir.), cert.
granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992); Brief for Petitioners, supra note 19, at 40-41.
125. McNary, 969 F.2d at 1364.
126. Reply Brief for Appellants, supra note 79, at 7; see supra note 114 and accompa-
nying text.
127. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 789 F. Supp. 1552, 1570 (S.D. Fla. 1991),
injunction dissolved and remanded by 949 F.2d 1109 (1 1th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 1245 (1992).
128. Id.
129. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 949 F.2d 1109, 1112 (11th Cir. 1991) (per
curiam) (Hatchett, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992).
130. See Exec. Order. No. 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,133 (1992).
131. Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution 167 (1972). Additionally, the
Restatement provides that the President "has authority to determine the interpretation of
an international agreement to be asserted by the United States in its relations with other
states." Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 326(1)
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enna Convention, i.e., to be rendered in good faith and consistent with
the plain meaning of the treaty's terms in their context and in light of its
object and purpose.132 As stated above, article 33's ordinary meaning
and purpose support extraterritorial application. If a United States Pres-
ident construes the treaty outside the constraints of the Vienna Conven-
tion "it represents not construction or interpretation, but the making of a
new treaty., 133
Furthermore, although "the meaning attributed to treaty provisions by
the Government agencies charged with their negotiation and enforce-
ment" is extremely influential, 134 the government has offered conflicting
interpretations. When the interdiction program began in 1981, a memo-
randum opinion for the Attorney General stated that article 33 applied
on the high seas.1 31 In addition, the U.S.-Haiti Agreement expressly pro-
vided that the United States will not return "any Haitian migrants whom
the United States authorities determine to qualify for refugee status." 
1 36
Further, President Reagan's Executive Order 12,324 mandated that the
INS and Coast Guard observe our international obligations by ensuring
that "no person who is a refugee will be returned without his consent."1 37
In 1985, the government formally reversed its position while defending
the interdiction program in Gracey1 38 The government argued that its
earlier interpretations should not control because the state simply as-
sumed "the premise that Article 33 applied on the high seas" without the
analysis employed in Gracey1 39 The Second Circuit, however, found the
government's present position to be "'the sort of post hoc litigation pos-
ture that is entitled to no deference'" and, as such, cannot negate the
plain language of article 33.1
The government has also attempted to use the negotiating history of
the 1951 Convention to discredit the above analysis. Article 32 of the
Vienna Convention provides that "supplementary means of interpreta-
tion," such as the negotiating history, may be used when the ordinary
meaning of the treaty language is "ambiguous or obscure; or... []eads
(1986). The President's interpretation, nevertheless, does not preclude the court from
making an independent determination. See Henkin, supra, at 167.
132. See Michael J. Glennon, Constitutional Diplomacy 142 (1990).
133. Id.
134. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982).
135. See Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1364 (2d Cir.), cert
granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992); Proposed Interdiction of Haitian Flag Vessels, 5 Op. Off.
Legal Counsel 242, 248 (1981) ("Individuals [interdicted at sea] who claim that they will
be persecuted... must be given an opportunity to substantiate their claims [under article
33].").
136. U.S.-Haiti Agreement, supra note 24, at 3560.
137. Executive Order No. 12,324, § 2(C)(3), 3 C.F.RI 180 (1982), reprinted in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182 (1988).
138. See Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Gracey, 600 F. Supp. 1396 (D.D.C. 1985), aff'd
on other grounds, 809 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
139. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 19, at 50 n.40.
140. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1364 (2d Cir.) (quoting
Lewis v. Grinker, 965 F.2d 1206, 1220 (2d Cir. 1992)), cert granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992).
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to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable."''
Nevertheless, the government has relied on the comments of the
Dutch delegate made to the Conference of Plenipotentiaries, which
drafted the final version of article 33. 142 The Dutch delegate stated that,
based on conversations with other representatives, he believed the gen-
eral consensus was that the word "return" should only apply to refugees
already in the territory and that "the possibility of mass migrations
across frontiers or of attempted mass migrations was not covered by arti-
cle 33." '1s The President of the Conference ruled that "'the interpreta-
tion given by the Netherlands representative should be placed on the
record.'"' This ruling can be read either as an "agreement" to this
interpretation, 145 or merely as "recording the view of a dissenting mem-
ber." 146 Only the joint intent of all the parties, however, can provide a
treaty's meaning.147
According to Louis Henkin, who served as the United States Repre-
sentative to the Committee responsible for drafting the 1951 Conven-
tion,'48 the drafters understood article 33 to mean that a state would not
be compelled to grant asylum to any refugee. But, once a refugee was
within its borders, a state could not return him to his oppressors. Fur-
ther, a state may not "a fortiori-reach out beyond its borders, pick up a
refugee off of the high seas and forcibly return him into the hands of his
oppressors."' 14 9 In an affidavit to the Supreme Court, Professor Henkin
explains that the delegates wanted to prevent the right of non-refoule-
ment from requiring a country to admit a mass of migrants as a group
without an individual determination that each migrant qualified for refu-
gee status. Thus, "[b]y expressing a caveat about mass migrations, the
delegates were confirming the right of non-refoulement attached to indi-
vidual refugees and not to groups. They were not limiting the territorial
141. Vienna Convention, supra note 109, § 3, art. 32, at 340; see also Sumitomo Shoji
Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 185 (1982) (plain meaning of treaty controls unless
there is strong evidence to the contrary).
142. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 19, at 43.
143. McNary, 969 F.2d at 1365 (quoting Summary Record of the Thirty-fifth Meeting,
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.35 (1951)).
144. Id.
145. See Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794, 840 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(Edwards, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
146. McNary, 969 F.2d at 1365. Twenty-six states participated in the 1951 Conven-
tion. Therefore, "[a]lthough the Dutch delegate's comments were placed on the record
without objection, it cannot be assumed that all delegates were in accord simply because
they did not object to their colleague's request to memorialize his view." Brief of Amicus
Curiae Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees at 15-16, Haitian
Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir.) (footnote omitted), cert. granted,
113 S. Ct. 52 (1992).
147. See Glennon, supra note 132.
148. See Affidavit of Louis Henkin 2, McNary v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. (U.S.
1992) (No. 92-344) (signed and sworn on Dec. 15, 1992) [hereinafter Henkin Af.].
149. Id. 10.
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reach of article 33. ' '1"O
Professor Henkin expressed this interpretation of article 33 one year
prior to the Conference. After the drafting committee rejected a
mandatory asylum provision, Henkin noted the following:
It did not, however, follow that the convention would not apply to
persons fleeing from persecution who asked to enter the territory of the
contracting parties. Whether it was a question of closing the frontier
to a refugee who asked admittance, or of turning him back after he had
crossed the frontier, . .. the problem was more or less the same.
Whatever the case might be, ... he must not be turned back to a
country where his life or freedom could be threatened. No considera-
tion of public order should be allowed to overrule that guarantee, for if
the State concerned wished to get rid of the refugee at all costs, it could
send him to another country, or place him in an internment camp.15'
George Warren, the United States delegate to the Conference in 1951,
never took any action to rescind Henkin's interpretation or to support
another interpretation.' 52 Accordingly, Henkin's statement "continued
as the official position of the United States government with regard to the
meaning of Article 33." 113
Article 33 may provide an independent basis for requiring the Court to
enjoin the forced repatriations"5 4 if it is considered a self-executing treaty
binding upon the United States irrespective of any act of Congress.'5 In
1982, the Second Circuit held that article 33 was not self-executing., 5 6
The Supreme Court, however, subsequently ruled that article 33 "im-
posed a mandatory duty on contracting States not to return an alien to a
country where his 'life or freedom would be threatened' on account of
one of the enumerated reasons."'5 7 Alternatively, the United States
could be considered bound under the principle of customary interna-
150. IdL 7.
151. Id 18 (quoting Summary Record of the Twentieth Meeting of the Ad Hoc Com-
mittee on Statelessness and Related Problems held Feb. 1, 1950, U.N. DOC. E/AC.32/
SR.20).
152. Id 9. Warren, along with delegates of 21 other countries, never endorsed the
Dutch delegate's interpretation of article 33. Reply Brief for Appellants, supra note 79,
at 8 nn.9, 10.
153. See Henkin Aff., supra note 148, 9.
154. For an analysis of the United States' obligation to observe non-refoulement under
article 33, see Arthur Helton, Ecumenical, Municipal and Legal Challenges to United
States Refugee Policy, 21 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 493, 508-11 (1986); King, supra note
26 at 778-87.
155. A self-executing treaty is effective upon ratification, whereas a non self-executing
treaty requires an act of Congress to bind the United States. See Henkin, supra note 131,
at 157-58.
156. See Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204, 218-19 (2d Cir. 1982) ("[Ihe Protocol's
provisions were not themselves a source of rights under our law unless and until Congress
implemented them by appropriate legislation.").
157. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 429 (1987) (quoting 1951 Convention,
supra note 4, art. 33).
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tional law.158
C. Executive Power
The government claimed that the interdiction program falls under the
President's exclusive power to act as "the sole organ of the nation in its
external relations." 159 According to the Supreme Court "[t]he exclusion
of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty. The right to do so stems
not alone from legislative power but is inherent in the executive power to
control the foreign affairs of the nation."'" The legality of the interdic-
tion program, however, does not implicate the "President's power to reg-
ulate 'entry' into the United States." '61 While the President can exclude
the Haitians from the United States, forced repatriation prevents these
Haitians from finding refuge in any other country.
Furthermore, in immigration matters, the executive's authority "is
limited to the zone charted by Congress. If such officers depart from the
channels of authority fixed by statute they act illegally." '162 President
Bush relied on sections 212(0163 and 215(a)(1) 1 4 of the INA to authorize
the interdiction program.1 65 These sections grant the President the au-
thority to limit entry into the United States and to establish rules gov-
erning an alien's departure or entry to the United States. Under settled
rules of statutory construction, however, sections 212(0 and 215(a)(1)
must be read consistently with section 243(h) of the same statute. Thus,
the Court cannot interpret these sections as providing the authority to
void section 243(h)'s mandatory duty. 166
III. ANALYSIS
Inconsistencies in the interdiction programs implemented by the Rea-
gan and Bush Administrations and the onset of litigation challenging the
legitimacy of these programs demonstrate the need for an authoritative
definition of the term "alien" in section 243(h) of the INA, as amended
by the Refugee Act of 1980. The absence of an authoritative definition
allowed the Bush and Clinton Administrations to pursue a policy of in-
terdiction at sea and immediate repatriation of Haitian nationals-a pol-
158. See Goodwin-Gill, supra note 3, at 97-100; King, supra note 26 at 787-94.
159. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1366 (2d Cir.), cert.
granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992) (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299
U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936) (citation omitted)).
160. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950) (citations
omitted).
161. See McNary, 969 F.2d at 1366.
162. 1 Charles Gordon & Stanley Mailman, Immigration Law & Procedure § 9.02, at
9-5 (1992) (citing Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924)).
163. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (1988).
164. 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a)(1) (1988).
165. See Exec. Order No. 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,133 (1992).
166. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 46, at 39; 2A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland
Statutory Construction § 47.04, at 146-47 (5th ed. 1992).
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icy that contradicts the Refugee Act's stated purpose of responding "to
the urgent needs of persons subject to persecution."1 6 Both the plain
meaning and the legislative history of the Refugee Act indicate that Con-
gress intended to strike a balance between the practical necessity of limit-
ing the number of refugees entering the nation with the moral necessity
of protecting aliens possessing legitimate refugee status. To this end, sec-
tion 208 of the INA directed the government to grant political asylum to
such aliens on a discretionary basis, 68 while section 243(h) prohibited
the return of aliens who qualify for refugee status into the hands of their
persecutors. 169 The Bush and Clinton Administrations' policy of inter-
cepting and repatriating all Haitians without determining refugee status
endangers the lives of those Haitians who possess a legitimate fear of
persecution. As a result, their policy violates both international law, as
expressed in article 33 of the U.N. Protocol, and the Refugee Act of
1980.
With this in mind, the Supreme Court should take the opportunity
presented in McNary v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc."o to define the
term "any alien" in section 243(h) to encompass those individuals inter-
dicted at sea. Any less comprehensive or definitive reading will ensure
that the government will continue to interpret section 243(h) according
to the ideological biases of particular presidential administrations.'' In
the context of the present crisis, any less comprehensive definition may
also result in the United States continuing to "return Haitian[ ] refugees
to the jaws of political persecution, terror, death and uncertainty."' 72
Alternatively, Congress should amend section 243(h) by adding a pro-
vision stating that the statute has extraterritorial application. "I This
would conclusively resolve the debate over the scope of section 243(h)
and would prevent future administrations from using this ambiguity to
justify policies that contradict the clear intent of the statute.
A. The United States' Legal Obligations
Assuming that the Supreme Court or Congress extends the term
"alien" in section 243(h) of the INA to encompass Haitians interdicted
167. Refugee Act of 1980 § 101(a), Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1521 note (1988)).
168. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988).
169. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
170. No. 92-344 (U.S. 1992).
171. See Mark Gibney, Who Is Our Favorite Refugee Today?, 15 Hum. Rts. 30, 32
(1988); see also Ira J. Kurzban, A Critical Analysis of Refugee Law, 36 U. Miami L Rev.
865 (1982) (discussing the role of ideology in United States refugee law).
172. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, No. 92 CV 1258, 1992 WL 155853, at "12
(E.D.N.Y. 1992) (Memorandum and Order dated June 5, 1992), order rev'd in part by
969 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992).
173. Senator Edward Kennedy has already proposed "the International Refugee Pro-
tection Act, which would write clearly into our immigration laws that the United States
cannot return persecuted refugees, regardless of where they come into U.S. custody."
138 Cong. Rec. S13,096, S13,096 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1992) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
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in international waters, the United States must still determine how to
deal with those Haitians possessing refugee status. According to the
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), "[a]pplication of the
principle of non-refoulement obviously presupposes that the asylum-seek-
ers be allowed to present a request to the competent authorities, that
their claim be duly examined and that they be in the meantime fully
protected against forcible return to their country of origin." 174 There-
fore, the Clinton Administration must restore a screening process. This
will bring the United States into compliance with domestic and interna-
tional law and will ensure that the government does not return to their
persecutors those Haitians with a legitimate claim for protection.
On January 14, 1993, then President-elect Clinton announced that
while he would continue the forced repatriations, he would upgrade the
screening process in Haiti. 175 This proposal, however, continues to vio-
late section 243(h) of the INA because Haitians interdicted at sea will
only be screened upon their return to Haiti. But if any of the intercepted
Haitians qualify for refugee status, non-refoulement prohibits their return
to Haiti. Furthermore, Grover Joseph Rees, General Counsel of the
INS, has offered additional reasons illustrating why this solution is inade-
quate.1 76 First, many Haitians are unable to apply for asylum due to a
shortage of telephones, a high illiteracy rate, and poor transportation to
Port-au-Prince. More importantly, applying for asylum in Haiti may
substantially increase an applicant's risk of identification and persecution
by Haitian government authorities.177 Similarly, Amnesty International
has warned:
Due to surveillance, intimidation and other factors, this opportunity
may only be illusory for those most in need of political asylum. For a
Haitian asylum seeker who is a victim of political persecution in his
own country, and who is on the run from the military or the police,
any attempt to apply for refugee status at the U.S. Embassy or Consu-
late in Haiti would expose them to a substantially increased risk of
additional political persecution.' 7 3
Another option is for the United States simply to resume the policy of
screening for refugees-those with a well-founded fear of persecution-
on board Coast Guard vessels or at the United States naval base at Guan-
tinamo Bay, Cuba, as was the practice from 1981 until the executive
order of May 1992. Although this approach would be an improvement
over the Bush Administration's policy, the shipboard interviews, never-
theless, are an inadequate screening device. 179
174. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, U.N. GAOR,
39th Sess., Supp. No. 12, at 7, U.N. Doc. A/39/12 (1984).
175. See Clinton to Continue Forcible Repatriations, supra note 12.
176. See Robert Pear, U.N. Drafts Asylum Plan for Haitian Boat People, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 31, 1992, at Al.
177. See id.
178. Brief of Amici Curiae Amnesty International, supra note 10, at 12.
179. See King, supra note 26, at 794-97; supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
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INS officials have not always adhered to the established guidelines reg-
ulating the interviews conducted at sea. In March 1986, for example, the
government intercepted a Haitian boat with thirty-eight passengers. The
assigned INS official spent a total of eighteen minutes interviewing the
aliens and concluded that not one of the passengers qualified for refugee
status, and returned the boat to Haiti.'10 Even after the INS changed its
procedures in an attempt to increase the "screen-in" rate, officials admit-
ted that the system was "dysfunctional," describing the ships as the
worst possible place to conduct an interview.'
Screening conducted at Guantinamo Bay may be a practical alterna-
tive." 2 This solution is viable only if the interdicted Haitians have the
opportunity to present their claims at a formal hearing. The UNHCR
defines the standard for assessing asylum claims as follows:
It is a general legal principle that the burden of proof lies on the
person submitting a claim. Often, however, an applicant may not be
able to support his statements by documentary or other proof, and
cases in which an applicant can provide evidence of all his statements
will be the exception rather than the rule. In most cases a person flee-
ing persecution will have arrived with the barest necessities and very
frequently even without personal documents. Thus, while the burden
of proof in principle rests on the applicant, the duty to ascertain and
evaluate all the relevant facts is shared between the applicant and the
examiner. Indeed, in some cases, it may be for the examiner to use all
the means at his disposal to produce the necessary evidence in support
of the application. Even such independent research may not, however,
always be successful and there may also be statements that are not
susceptible of proof. In such cases, if the applicant's account appears
credible, he should, unless there are good reasons to the contrary, be
given the benefit of the doubt.' 8 3
Accordingly, the Clinton Administration should structure new screening
guidelines and should retain qualified officials, trained in asylum law, to
conduct the interviews.
The government has taken the position that the Guantinamo facility
can accommodate a maximum of 12,500 people and that the potential
180. See Susan Freinkel, A Slow, Leaking Boat to Limbo; The plight of Haitian boat
people is now making headlines, but INS records point to years of seeming US indifference
to their asylum claims, Recorder, Dec. 19, 1991 at I.
181. See Beck, supra note 26, at 56. According to one officer, "'[t]he sun is a killer,
and the wind makes it impossible to write. Papers are curling up under twenty-to thirty-
knot winds."' Id. He also noted "'[t]here just is no privacy-scarcely the illusion of
privacy.... We were shoulder to shoulder with migrants while interviewing somebody
else.'" Id.
182. The government first brought interdicted Haitians to the United States Naval
Base at GuantAnamo Bay, Cuba in November 1991, following a temporary restraining
order enjoining repatriations. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 19, at 4; supra notes
46-48 and accompanying text.
183. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: Handbook on
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and
the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees 47, at 196 (1988).
1993]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
future mass migration of Haitian refugees may exceed Guanta'namo's ca-
pacity.184 In fact, the government asserted that this lack of space forced
President Bush to initiate immediate repatriations in the first instance. 8 5
The facts suggest, however, that the May 1992 executive order was a
response, instead, to the unprecedented high "screen-in" rates.' 8 6 To the
extent that limited space creates a problem, the new Administration
could seek the help of a third country able to provide additional facilities
at which to conduct the screening interviews. Screening aliens in a third
country, or at Guantinamo Bay, would have the dual benefit of protect-
ing Haitians while still determining refugee status prior to the aliens en-
tering the United States mainland.18 7
Once the government determines that a Haitian qualifies for refugee
status, the United States must decide what further responsibilities the
principle of non-refoulement demands. At a minimum, the Clinton Ad-
ministration should provide temporary refuge to those Haitians who
demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution. 8 8 The UNHCR pro-
poses that countries throughout the Western Hemisphere participate in a
joint effort to grant temporary asylum to the interdicted Haitians.'89
The success of such a program, however, depends upon the United
States' willingness to accept intercepted Haitians who prove their refugee
status. Without the United States' participation, other countries are not
likely to participate in the program.' 90
B. The United States' Moral Obligations
Humanitarian considerations implicit in the Haitian crisis prompted
legislative proposals granting Haitian refugees temporary safe haven in
the United States until the political crisis in Haiti is resolved. The con-
cern that the United States has a "moral responsibility to protect those
Haitians who have sought refuge from the turmoil in their homeland"
motivated these resolutions." ' Recognizing the oppressive conditions in
184. See Beck, supra note 26, at 57.
185. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 19, at 7.
186. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
187. See Pear, supra note 176.
188. Arthur Helton, Director Refugee Project for the Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights has stated that "the Clinton Administration must commit itself to resettling here
all the Haitian boat people who demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution." Id.
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. 137 Cong. Rec. S18,335, S18,409 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Deconcini). The United States' humanitarian commitment is etched in its history:
[W]e should remember that the United States is a land of immigrants, and since
the founding of the Republic we have had a special national heritage of concern
for the uprooted and persecuted... beyond our national ethos of humanitarian
concern for the uprooted and persecuted, there are solid foreign policy reasons
why we should involve ourselves substantially and regularly in resolving refugee
problems.., it is decidedly in our foreign policy interest to project in countries
around the world the image of.U.S. humanitarian assistance for refugees. Such
humanitarian assistance is a glowing example of the purposes and processes of
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Haiti, the proposals granted temporary refugee status to Haitians in
United States custody regardless of whether they could demonstrate an
individual fear of persecution.
Temporary refuge is a recognized practice under customary interna-
tional law that prohibits a country from forcibly repatriating aliens who
have fled civil strife in their homeland. The prohibition continues until
the hostilities in the aliens' homeland ceases.192 This practice is "pre-
mised upon the principles of humanity owed by the state to the interna-
tional community as a whole." '193 The UNHCR adopts the position that
"'in cases of large-scale influx, persons seeking asylum should always
receive at least temporary refuge.' 9)194 Temporary refuge is awarded to
all members of a particular country upon a showing of "de facto lack of
national protection due to occurrences within the country of national-
ity," and does not require each asylum-seeker to prove an individualized
fear of persecution. 195
By contrast, section 243(h) of the INA and article 33 of the U.N. Pro-
tocol require each alien to demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecu-
tion to qualify for protection. Individualized determinations of refugee
status are impractical, however, in cases of mass migration due to the
numbers of refugees involved and the possibility that a combination of
factors motivated their flight.196 Therefore, the policy of temporary ref-
uge is more applicable in situations of mass migrations.
In 1990, prompted by the continuing civil war and human rights viola-
tions in El Salvador, Congress added section 244A to the INA. 97 This
provision established, for the first time, a statutory scheme for the tempo-
rary refuge of aliens in the United States. This provision authorizes the
Attorney General to grant temporary protected status (TPS) to aliens not
eligible for asylum under current immigration laws, but who could not,
at present, return safely to their homelands.198 Section 303 of the INA
specifically designated nationals of El Salvador as beneficiaries under sec-
the free democracy which we are, and of the free society which makes such
assistance possible.
Deborah E. Anker & Michael H. Posner, The Forty Year Crisis." A Legislative History of
the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 San Diego L. Rev. 9, 38 (1981) (quoting Hearings on H.R.
3056 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship and Int'l Law of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977)).
192. See Deborah Perluss & Joan F. Hartman, Temporary Refuge: Emergence of a
Customary Norm, 26 Va. J. Int'l L. 551, 554 (1986).
193. Id at 616.
194. d at 571 (quoting Report on the Thirtieth Session of the Executive Committee of
the High Commissioner's Programme t 72, U.N. Doc. A/C. 96/572 (1979)).
195. Id at 583-84.
196. See Goodwin-Gill, supra note 3, at 116.
197. See Immigration Act of 1990 § 244A, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978, 5030-
36 (1990) (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
198. See Pamela A. Martin, Note, Temporary Protected Status and the Legacy of San-
tos-Gomez, 25 Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ. 227, 236-37 (1992).
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tion 244A.199
To qualify for TPS, an alien must remain "continually physically pres-
ent" in the United States from the date of TPS designation. 2°° Further-
more, an alien may not be admitted to the United States solely in order to
apply for TPS.20 1 The "physically present" clause, thus, eliminates the
threat of the possible mass influx of migrants to the United States after
TPS is granted to a particular nationality.2"
In February 1992, Representative John Conyers proposed a bill grant-
ing Haitians in United States custody temporary safe haven.20 3 The bill
eliminated the "physically present" requirement so that Haltians fleeing
violence and persecution could benefit from TPS until a democratic Hai-
tian government is restored. Urging Congress to adopt his proposal,
Representative Conyers emphasized the emergency nature of the
situation:
Haitians are dying on the seas, and they are being murdered and tor-
tured in their country simply for supporting democracy. Haitians are
willing to risk the sharks at sea rather than face their military at home.
That should tell us what we need to know about the bravery and the
desperation of Haitian refugees. 2 4
The Conyers bill was defeated but similar recommendations continued
to surface. 205 Bill Frelick of the United States Committee for Refugees,
for example, urged the Clinton Administration to grant Haitians TPS
either in the United States or at Guantfinamo Bay. Frelick views TPS as
a compromise that "allows a refuge for those who truly believe their lives
199. Immigration and Nationality Act § 244A note, 8 U.S.C. § 1254a note (Supp. III
1991).
200. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 244A(c)(1)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1254a
(Supp. III 1991).
201. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 244A(c)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(5) (Supp.
III 1991).
202. See 136 Cong. Rec. S17,106, S17,109 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) (statement of Sen.
Deconcini).
203. See Haitian Refugee Protection Act of 1992, 138 Cong. Rec. H802, H813 (daily
ed. Feb. 27, 1992) (amendment offered by Rep. Conyers).
204. Id.
205. For example a month later the Florida State Legislature recommended that
Congress:
(4) Urge the Attorney General to:
(a) Suspend all deportation and exclusion proceedings for Haitians in the
United States pending a resolution of the deep political and military crisis in
Haiti, as called for by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights; and
(b) Designate Haiti under section 244A(b)(1) of the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act relating to temporary protected status.
(5) Urge the United States Coast Guard to begin a coordinated search and
rescue at sea operation with respect to Haitians fleeing Haiti, stop the interdic-
tion of Haitian boat people, bring Haitians rescued at sea to the United States
for temporary safe haven, and save those Haitians who flee the violence, perse-
cution, and anarchy of their homeland, as called for by the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights.
House Memorial No. 49, 138 Cong. Rec. S4,027, S4,029 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1992).
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are in danger, but it also shows people that GuantAnamo or some other
camp is not just a stepping stone into the U.S."'2'
President Clinton, however, has ordered a naval flotilla around Haiti
to discourage a mass exodus.207 Accordingly, it is unlikely that the Clin-
ton Administration will adopt a policy granting TPS to all Haitians who
apply. Instead the Administration is working with the United Nations in
an attempt to resolve the political crisis in Haiti.' ° Nevertheless, the
forced repatriations without a hearing continue to violate the United
States' legal and moral obligations.
If President Clinton continues to order the interception of Haitians in
an attempt to keep them in Haiti, he must restore a screening process.
Further, the Administration must ensure the effectiveness of the screen-
ing mechanisms employed to distinguish between political and economic
migrants. Additionally, to promote the humanitarian considerations im-
plicit in non-refoulement, the United States should grant TPS to those
Haitians who prove an individualized fear of persecution, at least until
the political crisis in Haiti is resolved.
In 1990, Vaclav Havel addressed Congress cautioning that morality
not politics must control our actions:
We still don't know how to put morality ahead of politics, science and
economics. We are still incapable of understanding that the only genu-
ine backbone of all our actions-if they are to be moral-is responsibil-
ity. Responsibility to something higher than my family, my country,
my company, my success. Responsibility to the order of Being, where
all our actions are indelibly recorded and where, and only where, they
will be properly judged.
The interpreter or mediator between us and this higher authority is
what is traditionally referred to as human conscience. 09
By acknowledging this moral responsibility, the Clinton Administration
would ensure the United States' compliance with its legal and moral obli-
gations under section 243(h) of the INA.
CONCLUSION
The humanitarian basis of section 243(h) reflects the goal of protection
of human life. To realize this goal fully, the statute must necessarily
apply to Haitians intercepted by the United States on the high seas. The
ordinary meaning of the text as well as the legislative history substantiate
this analysis. The Supreme Court or Congress must explicitly define the
extraterritorial range of section 243(h) in order to remove the ideological
biases currently determining who benefits from its protection.
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Haitian Exodus, Wash. Post, Jan. 21, 1993, at A14.
208. See Clinton to Continue Forcible Repatriations, supra note 12.
209. 136 Cong. Rec. H392, H395 (daily ed. Feb. 21, 1990) (address by Vaclav Havel,
President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic).
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